Ukraine and Russia Russia and Ukraine

                                                                                   АЛЕКСАНДР КУСТАРЕВ

                                                              РОССИЯ  И  УКРАИНА        

First Published in Russian:  “Kosmopolis—Космополис (МГИМО) №2 2007 

                                                                                   Cousinage est dangereux voisinage 

When Slaves argue among themselves (Спор славян между собою: Пушкин) 

Russian-Ukrainian relations today represent an excellent example of fraternal rivalry (brotherly hatred) [1]  Russia and Ukraine think about each other too much. A 2006 poll [Взгляд 2006, referring to ВЦИОМ] showed that 67% of Russians watch Ukraine, 16% regularly, 52% from time to time. This is very high level of concern. And I mean the 15% figure, not the breath-taking 67%. 

But the seemingly routine accompanying report is actually even more informative than the poll it refers to. The report is written in such a way as to lead readers tow2ards a particular interpretation of the figures. 15%” looks very modest compared to the 67% figure but i8n fact it’s ver4y significant. There is also great emphasis placed on the fact that young people are much less interested in Ukrainian affairs than the elderly. In the over 45 age group

The figure is 73% whereas in the 18-24 age group it’s “only” 56%. But the most especially characteristic is the following: “Every second Russian (52%) believes that Ukrainian people are taking a wrong direction. But only 9% think the opposite, and in fact only a third of those, i.e. 3% are absolutely positive.” Of course, what is important is not how exactly Russians evaluate Ukraine’s direction, but that they have strong propensity to evaluate them in the first place. The compiler of this report just doesn’t notice that. It is more important for him that even the pathetic 9%, who approve Ukraine’s policy are not certain they are right. And the report doesn’t say anything about those who disapprove of Ukraine’s direction. Perhaps, ВЦИОМ just failed to ensure informational symmetry (which is perfectly possible). Perhaps, the data were massaged by Взгляд’s editors.

Regardless of how much ordinary Russians think about Ukraine, politically active segment of Russian society is very much concerned with Ukraine (subconsciously or consciously) judging by ВЦИОМ's and Взгляд’s Freudean slips  -- that’s a fact. Ukraine, and its close relationships with Russia are important themes of Russian political life.

As to Ukraine’s obsession with Russia, it is not only absolutely obvious but has in fact been totally dominating fully been dominating Ukraine’s self-identification narrative for a long time.

 “Ukraine is nor Russia” – this is the title of Leonid Kuchma’s book (2004). And the former Ukrainian president is far from an extreme anti-Russian nationalist. But he couldn’t or didn’t want to find a different title for his book. Ant if he simply realised that he couldn’t afford to call it anything else, then that fact is even more significant.   

The ethnical affinity of Ukrainians and Russians overburdens the mind of both. By purely objective characteristics (looking from outside) Russians and Ukrainians are much closer to each other than Serbs and Croates, for instance6 Germans and Austrians, and even Lombardians and Sicilians.

Whether or not Ukrainians and Russians were different “nations” two century ago, really doesn’t matter now. At that time the problem of sel- identification wasn not an issue for either. Both consisted of a multitude of local groups and rthnicitis, who all could pronounce themselves “nations” if they wanted to.

In Soviet time, Moscow encouraged a narrative of self-identification and ethic (“national”) art and culture. Russians and Ukrainians (by birth) lived together in big industrial cities (both in Russia and Ukraine), which has led to the emergence of a sort of cultural amalgam and, of course, inter-marriage. Family links between Ukraine and Russia were no less extensive than between the two parts of the divided Germany.     

Russia and Ukraine were the two biggest members of Soviet Union, making up its core. They constituted, if you like, the “two-headed hegemon” of the Soviet geopolitical conglomerate.

Because of the  intensely authoritarian character of the Soviet state, all of the ethnic entities participating in it, believed that they were being completely suppressed by the Centre, i.e. Moscow, i.e. Russia. And this alleged subordination of Ukraine to Russia is now clearly reflected in the emerging Ukrainian national narrative with its strong “post-colonial” tone. But Russia itself, at the end of the USSR’s existence, also developed this complex, and not without reason.  

Besides, Ukrainians do not actually realise just how popular amongst Russians was the op0posite myth that Moscow was dominated by Ukrainians. Of corse, ethnically-focused Ukrainian purists do not recognise Khrushchev or the “Dnepropenrovsk mafia” as genuine Ukrainians, but for Russian purists they were “from Ukraine” and subsequently “them” as opposed to “us”. It doesn’t matter who was right.  What really matters, that in the “centre”, i.e. in the political leadership of the Soviet Union, there was an integral core that could be identified as “Russukrainian” or Ukrorussian” [2].  

Their long-existent shared political (Soviet) establishment, their massive common ethno-cultural heritage and active merger at the time of industrialisation created a very special, probably unprecedented  “ethno-geopolitical dyad” with an unusual, perhaps unique mode of coexistence. The closest to this are, perhaps, anglo-scottish and anglo-irish examples.  

Both Ukraine and Russia have a double identity. The people themselves (their ethnic elites) are absolutely free to perceive themselves as different entities and to name themselves differently in sdifferent contexts, but their residual, or, conversely, on the contrary, newly acquired double identity is still there and will remain forever.

In Ukraine’s case this is perfectly visible. No matter hoe much it insists on its own special ethnic identity and historical destiny, it is perceived nonetheless by the rest of the world as just “another Russia”. And more than that: it perceives itself as such, at least subconsciously. Many observers (for instance, Riabchuk : 2003) have diagnose this ambivalent self-identification  of   

the Ukrainian citizens.

The same syndrome can be seen in Russia as well. It is less visible because Russians tend to see in Ukrainians the same Russians as themselves and to deny Ukrainians the status of a different people. But it is not difficult to detect another more abstract idea of Russians’ and Ukrainians’ complete identities which can be turned either direction: it is possible to say that Ukraine is Russia as well as that Russia is Ukraine, isn’t it? 

The Ukrainian-Russian (or Russian-Ukrainian?) historian N.I. Kostomarov, reflecting on the ethnic status of Slavonic regions within the Romanov Empire, suggested that there were in fact “two Russian peoples”  This well thought out and cunning new notion was later picked up in variety of guises (including Grushevsky’s «Ukraine-Rus’» notion), but did not appeal either to Ukrainian nationalist activists, nor to the Petersburg Bureaucracy which prior to 1917) was attempting to build up the Russian nation both in the French model (“from the State”) and the German model (“from the Volk”)   

The former were afraid that if they saw themselves as “the other Russians” instead of “Ukrainians”, they would lose their substance and subsequently of their right to independence (and even to autonomy). And the latter, ironically, were terrified that if Ukrainians were converted from “just Russians” into “the other Russians”, their right to independence would in fact gain actual recognition.

In our time, when the the idea of the fusion of “a people” and “a state” into a special substance called “a nation” (be it “Staatsnation”, “Kulturnation” or “Volksstaat”) is no longer considered any more either an imperative norm or realistically achievable, Kostomarov’s idea can be rewritten as the idea of two Russian states, if not in name then in essence. A number of approximate analogies do exist: Germany/Austria, Tshech Rep./Slovakia, Serbia/Croatia several Anglo-saxon countries (by their origins at least and through common language). All of them look fairly close to this pattern, at least for the outside observer, if not for themselves,.

Different people can live within the same state. The same people can live in two different states. If an independent geopolitical entity has existed for a long time, citizens with different ethnicities (strongly or feebly experienced) will inevitably have split self-identities. The same will happen to the same people , divided into two states. It looks that a significant part of the Ukrainian public are perfectly prepared to consider Ukraine as just another Russia. S0 an interesting collection of essays is called just that “The Two Rus’s” [Две Руси, 2004]

The relationship between Russia and Ukraine is heavily overburdened by status-prestige considerations. It’s a perfect illustration of what René Girard baptised “rivalité mimétique. Girard sets up the substance of his theory of conflict explaining Islamist terrorism after 9/11: “The conflict can not be explained adequately by differences.  In fact, the conflict is rooted in the competition, mimetic rivalry of living creature, nations, cultures. The competition is generated by the desire to imitate the other, to achieve the same as the other, with the help of violence if necessary. Of course, terrorists are threatening as from another world but they are motivated not by the difference between their world and ours. The differences take away two world from each other. The urgent need to be tse same as the other, to become identical with him – that’s what if fraught with terrorism. Human relationships are essentially relationships of imitation, competition ……” [Girard 2001]

Girard’s general theory of competition, therefore, suggests that the competition between two players, regardless of their contrasting rhetoric, in reality is fed energetically by their sameness. [3]

This is ostensibly supported by the dominant topics of the Ukrainian-Russian dialogue. The first bone of contention between them is Kievan Rus’. Whose heritage is it? Russia’s or Ukraine’s? In fact, it is a debate about who can call themselves “genuine Russians”.  Even the right to be given very name «Rus’» is harshly disputed. Titles such as like «Ukraine is Rus’» or «The Stolen Name»  speak for themselves. There are three pretenders to this historical name: Russians, Ukrainians and, Rusins, who are, one argument goes, actually the purest descendants of historical Rus’, at least in purely racial terms.     

Before the collapse of USSR, Russian--Ukraine was overshadowed by anti-Soviet rhetoric, which united all dissident groups. But after Ukraine became independent, this rivalery emerged in its purest form. Both countries were concerned not only with of their own individual position in various spurious  comparator ratings[4], but even more so with which of the two of them was placed higher. The media compare Ukraine and Russia persistently when reviewing such ratings. A good example is the following: the commentary of a 2007 World Bank Report on the quality of administration in different countries  [«Ведомости», 16 July 2007]. Djth countries would be perfectly happy to find herself even second from bottom, if only the other was placed bottom. This competitive atmosphere is especially heated because both countries are perfectly aware that they are steadfastly watched by global public opinion, and in particular by the USA and EU who have taken on (not entirely without a reason) the role of judges who evaluate other countries’ achievements in democracy, civilisation or human rights.

 “Mimetic competition” is, of course, a two-sides coin. It can be fruitful, destructive (the case of terrorism) or simply sterile for one partner or for both. Much depends on the field where competition takes place. The efficiency of purely economic competition, for instance, is higher than competition for social prestige (status). 

Economic competition is much more compatible with cooperation than political competition or competition for higher social status. The last, probably, rules out cooperation alltogether. It is always perfectly possible to arrange a “return match” in cases of economic competition, provided the winner is not entitled to suppress competition. Each loser has the chance of fresh start, and this is exactly what secures the constant innovation, overall enrichment and society’s progress onward and forward.

Competition  in the political sphere can also be fruitful, but successful outcome is less likely because it is easier to simulate the results of political competition, and unfortunately it could all the outcome of political competition is easier to simulate and unfortunately all can be

com down to such a simulation. The political space both of Russia and Ukraine is nowadays  full of simulation (although not necessarily premeditated) [5].

And finally competition purely for prestige in self-identification is absolutely sterile and perhaps even detrimental. At worst, it can end in violence. And in any case it leads to a stalemate of constant repetition of the same scenario (as in Gogol’s classics “how Ivan Ivanovich and Ivan Nikiforovich quarrelled), where both sides consider themselves the winner, without really achieving anything. 

Competition for status generally manifests itself as angry wrangling taking place in the field of such a competition of historiography, or more precisely national tradition or -- as we prefer to call it nowadays – narrative [6].

The purpose of national narrative is to prove the legitimacy of a sovereign geopolitical entity. The pattern of such narrative was devised by the early nation states who emerged in Europe and America in XIX century. They rested on two pillars. First, on the presentation of a given multitude as an integral unity of blood, mother tongue (Muttersprache) and terrain (Boden). Second, on the existence of a “common biography”, allegedly undivided and uninterrupted. Nation-states reconstructed their lengthy and heroic past as a gradual consolidation or struggle for liberation.

The narratives of every state to emerge subsequently has been built after this model. It was assumed that the was no nation without a state and no state without a nation. The Ukrainian narrative was built up in the same way.

The Ukrainian narrative is today, arguably, the most self-assertive  in the world. Probably -- because Ukraine’s self-identification has been suppressed for a long time, and the engineering of its own narrative is belated. Indeed, the only comparably active narrative is that of Russia. Although the  narrative itself is much older, its agency is very keen to rewrite it afresh. Nowone is currently able to match the Russians and the Ukrainians in their deadly serious attitude  to the very notion of “nation”. It appears that their emotional investment in their nationhood is greater than of France and Germany during the whole “long XIX century” (i.e. until the end of the Second World War). Unsurprisingly, it’s a Ukrainian (Olgerd Ippolit Bochkovs’ky) who represents the most essentialist interpretation of a “nation” as a phenomenon [Бочковьский 1918]. And Russian authors seem to be the most persistent in popularising his approach which is in itself significant. 

It would be pointless to remind Ukrainians and Russians and, above all , their “ethno-intelligentsia” (as the agency responsible for thic hectic narrativist activity), that the “nation” is a myth (though instrumental and perhaps even realisable) and that their totemic myths (as all others) are full of fabrication. It would be arrogant and hypocritical to insist that all statist commonalities cancel out of any kind of epic self-identification mythology. Above all else, it is simply not realistic.

 because creating totemic myth is an important manifestation of the existence of any collective entity regardless of what exactly is its foundation. And this kind of mythmaking has for some time now been the  raison d’etre of an expanding professional group – and we can’t simply shut it up, can we?

The only hope is that Russian and Ukrainian political life will escape from the shadow of this anachronistic passeist narrative. Quite simply, this narrative is counterproductive at the beginning of the new XXI century and is no longere suitable as a paradigm for political life absolutely regardless of how truthful or untruthful it may be..    

Don’t look down

The Ukrainian narrative, constructed in the XIX century mould attempts to convince Ukraine and the outside world that the Ukrainian nation (or proto-nation) has existed for centuries and has its own own lengthy and respectable tradition of statehood.  

Why is it so necessary to prove this?  Because the agents of this narrative i8nstinctivelym fear

that if they do not do it, they will (a) lose the right to exist in their own eyes and (b) lose their legitimacy within the world order.   

The narrative which tends to consider Ukraine as an eternal essentialist entity, is, of course, a reaction to historical criticism of the origins and composition of the modern-day Ukraine as a state. This criticism, especially popular among Russians, has two strands. First, critics insist that Ukrainian ethnicity is an artificial construction and “chimerical” [Родин 2006]. Second, critics say that Ukraine, internationally recognised after the Brest peace treaty, is what used to be known as the “Right bank Little Russia” («правобережная Малороссия»). Contemporary Ukraine is 7 times bigger. It was created within and by the USSR. Ukraine, the argument goes, has profited from the results of the Russian Empire’s and the USSR’s territorial expansion. Therefore, Ukraine obtained territory that didn’t belong to it, purely because the borders between Soviet Republics automatically became international borders [Афанасьева 2005 : 26-29].  

What objections can Ukraine raise to these arguments? [7] It can maintain that any ethnic entity is an intellectual construct – according to current convention. And as to her recent territorial acquisitions, Ukraine can and should point outt that the majority of existing geopolitical units (including Russia itself) are themselves not “organic” but historical and situational, and the only adequate reason for their existence is international recognition. If, suppose, the south-eastern part of Ukraine (Novorossia), Krym or Galizia declare independence or their intention to reunite with Russia and Poland; and if Russia stirred up controversy (not absurd in purely legal terms, even if absolutely pointless) about the legitimacy of converting intra-Soviet republican borders into international ones, the same problems would occure on different levels, in a different context, and those conflicts would be decided in a different way – amicably or not, with intermediaries or not etc. But non of this has happened, so what is the point of discussing it? Do you want to happen what happened around Ailsas-Lorrain or Karabakh? No? Then forget all of these “historical» and “ethnographical” arguments.       

Not a single geopolitical entity, from the archetypal ones, like England and France, to the most recently born, like Bosnia and Eritrea, was created through the Will of God as people was in XIXth century believed. Leopold Ranke was wrong when he said  «Staaten sind Gedanken Gottes». The phenomenon of “state” (”the state” and anyone of a type) was not providential but circumstantial product of evolution, and, I daresay, largely experimental.

The youngest states have neither a moral nor a legal obligation to characterize themselves in this way, that is as the manifestation of some eternal ideal “national” substance, maliciously suppressed until now,. Anyone, of course, can stylise themselves in this way, if they so desire, but whether it is really necessary, is an open question.

The technical necessity (for diplomatic efficiency) of a teleological and essentialist ethnic self- asserting narrative is also highly doubtful. The story of the distant historical past, no matter how immaculately true or how craftily constructed, will not rescue Ukraine or Russia or any other geopolitical entity, if it is not cemented by something more substantial (or rather material) or by some kind of collective achievements. In the past, it would have meant military victories; now the achievements are more likely to feature economic successes or victories on the football pitch. On the contrary, any narrative that a multitude imposes on itself, will hang over its head as a Damoclean sword (witch on Khoma Brut’s neck: Gogol)  , inculcating upon the multitude not rational but doctrinal political orientations and solutions and preventing any search for an efficient formula for pragmatic civic solidarity (unity).  

The future existence of newly emerged state-commonalities no longer depends on their past existence, either legally, morally or technically. Postmodern states do not need historical depth. This is true for all states, even those that took shape before the Modern era. Now, even France and England, China and the USA have to reinvent themselves. The fact that they have existed since some “….teenth” century or since the Stone Age is not a sufficient reason for their continued existence.

Anatol Lieven (Lieven  : 139) in his relatively recent book on Russo-Ukraiian relations quotes Ukrainian politologist Vilen Gorsky who said: “The more you think about your glorious past the more difficult it is for you to deal with your present”. And quite right too. I don’t know to whom Gorsky addressed this sentence (very Nietzschean, by the way), but it is certainly relevant for any postmodern state, whatever its past – glorious, not very glorious, not glorious at all or just non existent.

Today Ukraine’s real “past” is the dissolution of USSR, itself the result of the absolutely natural tendency of enormous and incoherent formations to disintegration and which was incidentally and presciently anticipated  as inevitable by the Ukrainian nationalist Yuri Lipa (of all people) [Липа 1954 : ???].

The rest of Ukraine’s history is archaeology and folklore. Kievan Rus’ is a kind of Carthage or even more accurately Atlantis. Prolonged casuistry is possible in terms of recent past, but it is dangerous for both parties. This “lava” is still not fully cooled.Iit would be better for all to let it cool as soon as possible, rather than heating it up again. 

The cult of the heroic struggle for independence is equally inefficient for practical policies6 irrespective of whether the heroism is exaggerated or not. This cult is fraught with irrational confrontation, costly for all parties, of recently emerged states and those, whom their narrative portrays as their former oppressors. Never mind that it stands in the way of any practical activity in the new states, which remain drugged by the feeling of their real or imagined victory.  

It is often pointed out that the struggle for independence never generated the concept of Ukraine as an individual geopolitical entity. But how could it be otherwise? Indeed, it is difficult to see now how anybody could have hoped this would happen. Neither the USA nor India conceptualise themselves as victors who managed to throw off the British yoke. Whereas Haiti, of all nations, perceived itself as victorious over France, Zimbabwe -- as victorious over Britain. Palestine attempts to present itself as victorious over Israel. Has it helped them much? 

In contrast with classical territorial states, whom they routinely imitate, postmodern geopolitical entities did not create themselves but emerged as fillers in an the already existing global system created not by them and almost without their participation. They don’t need a passeist narrative. They need and can afford something different, namely a futuristic narrative, or, if you like, a project.

It is said that Ukraine does not have yet such a project. And this, it is assumed (perhaps correctly) is dangerous because newly emerged states can embody their sovereignty at the first stage of their existence only in the form of such a project. 

In Russia, both the public at large and the influential (hard to say to which extent) part of the political establishment (partocracy) would be happy to see Pproject Ukraine” collapse –  rivalité mimétique, once more. But Moscow should be more cautious, because the failure of “Project Ukraine” will create enormous problems for Russia itself. For example, even if inthe simplest scenario Kiev decided it wanted to return to the bosom of Russian-Ukrainian unity [8], such a move could undo the  irresistible federalist tendency in this “Greater Russiaa”. So far it is no evidence that the Russian public and the Russian establishment realize the trap that Moscow would fall into in such circumstances, nor, indeed, have any idea of how it would get out of it.       

In the meantime, today’s Russia is also a postmodern state, albeit overburdened (and not equipped as admirers of Russian statehood would prefer to believe, equipped) with the institutions and political culture of the country’s pre-modern and imperial past. As a project, Russia is very vague and shaky itself. Its reinvention has been so far blocked in a spectacular manner by futile noisy attempts to revive its traditional statehood and glorious superpower status. However, as a native American wisdom goes: if you notice that your horse is dead, the best strategy is to dismount. The Russian imperial statist tradition is a dead horse. Full stop.

The futurist narrative is, of course, more creative than the passeist  Or, shall we say, the idea of a project is more useful than of a narrative. However, the transition from a passeist to futurist mode of self-identification is not an easy one for any historical political entity. In the first place, a project could be no more than a futurological stylisation of a passeist narrative and condemn such a project’s agents to remain to a vicious tautological circle («Заколдованное место» Гоголя). 

Such is the desperation to find a pattern (even a fictional one) of ethnic homogenisation and comprehensive (total) statist solidarist mobilization of a circumstantial geopolitical entity.  

At the moment everyone seems to be falling over each other to warn Ukraine against embarking on such a project, which is necessary as Ukraine (despite its highly active ethno-intelligentsia) has been constitutionally declared as multi-ethnic society; everyone dwelling within the Ukrainian borders is recognized as Ukrainian citizen. On the other hand, the problem of language (according to witnesses) seems to concern no one; Ukrainians use Russian  willingly, and Russians would be happy to see the Ukrainian language as the official state language. And some cultural homogenisationis inevitable anyway [9] to the extent that it is necessary for the efficiency of any common economic activity [10]. 

But the problems related to the ethnic heterogeneity and solidarist mobilization may become more acute and even bring the two parties to the brink of armed conflict, if a geopolitical entity is incapable of  offering its citizens a viable alternative project. The commentators of aggressive patriotism explain it in a dozen different ways but it is enough to refer to one: it is the easiest way to fill up political vacuum. Just like conversation about weather when there is nothing else to talk about.

There are some indications, that post-modern multiculturalism finds itself under pressure in this vacuum. The source of this pressure can be found in the upper echelons of public opinion where the situation is given intensive thought. Taras Kuzio, seemingly the most learned of commentators, says: “If nation building is not considered as desirable any more, and often criticized, Ukraine will find herself in a disadvantageous situation. This can be understood as follows: if they were allowed to pursue ethnic unification, why aren’t we? Such a dramatic rhetoric reflects total confusion of an elite, squeezed between two authoritative doctrines, not yet recognising that escape from this awkward situation can only be found through an option rather than making a choice between these two doctrines.             

Russia has a stronger tendency than any other country to hide in futuristically stylised passeism. Russia, no less vigorously. than Ukraine is stirring up “national self-consciousness” preferring to argue that its past obsession with its imperial mission caused its week ethnic self-identity, and that this deficit can now be rectified by the country mobilizing now under the banner of its legendary statehood [11].

To avoid such disguised passeism, it is essential to have a well developed method of devising a geopolitical entity. Such a met5hod requires rationally oriented, adequately qualified and strongly opinionated (partisan) government or a charismatic leader with powerful intuition who is capable of breaking with the past himself and  mobilising the will of those whom he is going (promises) to bring out of this past.  

Let us imagine that, one of these is in place. This is still not enough, because such a strategic project is fraught with many dangers – any project, shall we say, is “its own weakest point”

Constructivist voluntarism (bureaucratic or charismatic) may be no less dangerous than an attempt by a situational commonality to imitate retrospectively a certain authoritative pattern of constitutional solidarity. Creative (projective) constructivism, as radical liberals (like F.von Hayek) insist (and not without reason) can produce “lifeless forms” and eventually immensely reduce society’s efficiency in terms of economy, energy, information, or ecology [12].      

Both the narrative and the project have to be emotionally inspiring but they must also have as few obligations and as few details as possible. Their place is alongside arms and colours in the package of national symbols. The project’s rhetoric has to be closer to the slogan and the brand than to the instruction or technical specification. And the imperative behind the project must be not at odds with the imperative imposed on any geopolitical entity by the global geopolitical order.

And this order expects only one thing from all its members: not to become a source of international disorder. The international community doesn’t want excessive geopolitical dynamics; it is oriented around the preservation of the status quo. [13]   

All of this reminds me of a classic joke: An old Jew wonders: What is most important in this war? Some people say the infantry; others say artillery; or tanks; or the aviation…. All rubbish; what’s most important in this war is to stay alive.

 Generally speaking, what is most important for any newly emerging state is to stay alive. For them, the project is more important than any narrative, and current day-to-day policies are more important than the project. According to Renan’s famous  metaphor “a nation is a daily referendum”, which means that nation is a perishable and even ephemeral substance: here today, gont tomorrow. One can say nowadays, paraphrasing this metaphor, that any newly emerging state is an experiment.

It means that the historically circumstantial political entities, that are known by the names

 “Ukraine” and “Russia” test their legitimacy anew every day; in other words they have to secure a sufficient minimum level of civic loyalty from their citizens, and thus in turn their stability. And if they succeed time and again in these regular rehabilitations, they will achieve certain inertia of existence, occupying their niche within the global web with its, as its activists prefer to speak, “mission” or “uniqueness”.  These “Ukraine” and “Russia” may become unrecognisable  and unacceptable for the current generation of “Russians” and “Ukrainians” but that is not, I’m afraid to say, any of their bloody business, simply because it won’t be them, who will be living in these entities. Would a German or a Japanese character from the end of XVIIIth century be satisfied with contemporary Germany or Japan? I suspect they would feel feeling like Merlin finding himself on Wembley stadium, or Rip van Winkle on Broadway.        

How long is this experimental phase supposed to last? One might imagine that it will never be over for any state in existence at the moment. In any case, Ukraine and Russia are yet to complete the experimental phase: they are bound to experiment time and again and their strategy of experimentation has to observe certain rules. Here, we’re going to look at just one of them: never announce something you do not know how to realize. And that means first and foremost, do not hope that the narcissistic myth of your past will help you to survive.

West-ho! Either?

Nations , in their relations with each other, can become hostages of their mythological imperatives.                

Which conflict is primary and which is secondary? Is conflict of status, expressed as narrative, generated by the conflict of vested geopolitical interests or vice versa? Or are they is autonomous6 and do not depend on each other? Or perhaps there in no real conflict between these two countries at all and the clash of  narratives is not more than a completely sterile conspicuous demonstration of prestige? And, finally, who are the agencies of mutual hostility – the same in both cases or different?   

A.Lieven cites Vilen Gorski’s opinion: “All these quarrels about history are relevant only for a handful of nationalist intellectuals; ordinary people, both Ukrainians and Russians, wouldn’t give a damn”

But an analysis of current Ukrainian statehood’s reveals its shortcomings as a lack of institutions, the influence of informal agencies, insufficient social control over the state, and the destructive activities of elites (in German: destructives Elitenhаndeln). The manipulation of narrative for the sake of prestige-status could be considered as one such “destructive activity”, could it not? And here you go: a “handful of nationalist intellectuals”, as V.Gorski calls them, are practicing exactly this. So, even if it is just a mouse it is perfectly capable of begetting a mountain.

Our materialistic instinct suggests that all conflicts (quarrels) in the field of narrative are just the propagandist orchestration of other conflicts – for the territory, resources, markets, rents et cetera. But even if this is true, they are perfectly capable, having been turned into habit, of becoming self-perpetuating or even of generating new conflicts. In fact, national practices of self-identification and nations’ geopolitical and economic interests influence each others in turn.

It is risky, of course, to insist that there are no geopolitical and economic contradictions between two countries. Nevertheless, the odd thing could be that these conflicts were triggered (or at least have intensified) by the problems of both states’ self-identification. It would be two hazardous to say that the conflict about the “pipe” is far-fetched or secondary. But to eliminate this suspicion is also not easy.  

In an article, written specifically for the Financial Times to explain the situation to Western business circles, a big boss Viktor Khristenko says that Russia is simply putting a stop to the old Soviet practice of subsidizing energy prices for its neighbours. We, he says, are just switching to the market economy, but find ourselves being blamed for politicising the energy market. In the 15 years since the dissolution of the USSR we’ve been subsidizing former Soviet Republics by selling energy at prices 25% below the world market average. This has to stop in any event, and this, in fact, a condition of Russia’s joining the IMF. Furthermore -- and more crucially: “Our plan to lay the North-European pipe under the Baltic Sea is just a way of diversing Europe’s gas supply [Khristenko 2006].

This all looks highly reasonable, but another viewpoint  is perfectly possible: “The IEA believes that if Russia wants to remain a major energy producing world power and Gasprom to be the main guarantee of Europe’s and Asia’s energy security, they have to invest differently: not to buy assets and lay  new pipes but to develop new deposits and cut costs. But the Russian Government to whom this advice is addressed, shows no intention of taking it” [Петрачкова 2006] 

Thus, it is not necessary to disavow Khristenko’s arguments in order to detect a strongly irrational element in Moscow’s energy strategy. This irrationality can be explained, of course, in different ways, but the irresistible desire to repress or at least to punish Ukraine is one possible explanation and indeed the most likely.

But to punish Ukraine for what? Perhaps, just for its self-promotional nationalist positioning and no doubt for Ukraine’s declared intention to drift towards the West, to the EU and the NATO, potentially even joining these groups formally.

The idea of tearing Ukraine away from Russia has been cherished for a long time by the military-diplomatic circles of states who found themselves in acute geopolitical competition with Petersburg-Moscow. It’s they who regularly tried to play the Ukrainian card against Russia. It was persistently recommended by so called Ostforschung (Germany’s consultative clique in the imperialist era), vacillating between creating a belt of puppet states along the border with Russia and the straightforward colonisation of Slavonic lands (taken to an absurd extreme by Hitler) [14]. 

When Ukraine and Russia were finally split without any outside agency’s help into two separate geopolitical entities, there were those who were keen to deepen this split [15].

But to rationalize the old geopolitical thesis about the necessity of separating Ukraine from Russia, now is much more difficult now than it was. In the current military-diplomatic environment, in the atmosphere of fundamental pacifism in Europe, the classical geopolitical arguments for this split are irrelevant and simply anachronistic.

Only a couple of influential American think tanks worshipping “democratic fundamentalism” (Gabiel Garcia Marques) continue to support the idea of Ukraine drifting further from Russia, converting this geopolitical concept into geo-ideological one. Ukraine is placed at the “East of American messianic consciousness” as a kind of an “outpost of democracy”. F.Lukyanov, editor of the journal “Russia in global politics” writes: “The Orange Revolution for foreign observers is nothing less than a decisive battle between Russia and a “united West” for  strategic influence over the last remaining country of  “Graeter Europe”, that has yet to find its identity …..  Moscow, with its typically blunt foreign policy, has never made a secret of its purely geopolitical motives; it even emphasized them. Western capitals cautiously avoided all geopolitical allusions, stressing the values of democracy, but this mask slipped time and again both in the comments of media as well as the occasional statements of some politicians”. (Лукьянов 2006)

Nonetheless, the entry of Ukraine into the EU and/or NATO is not on the agenda for the time being. The EU’s further enlargement is not envisaged by its establishment. Ukraine is included in a few EU cooperation arrangements (Action Plan,  Partnership and Cooperation Agreement, Wider Europe Initiative, European Neighbourhood  Policy) but they do not anticipate Ukraine’s later accession to the EU, on the contrary; they are specifically devised as alternatives to this scenario  [Gallina 2005 : 209]. The same author believes that “in spite of the rhetoric, Ukraine is still considered as a Europe’s backyard by in the EU’s influential circles, where they are secretly glad, that Ukraine simply isn’t fit for EU membership according to the official criteria, and this is precisely what frees the EU from the responsibility of making that crucial political choices [Gallina 2005 : 209] But, regardless of what’s going on within the formal diplomatic sphere, the public debate about the perspective of Ukraine joining the EU is in itself a significant part of Russian-Ukrainian relations.

The conspicuous yearning of Ukrainian politicians to join the  “euro-Atlantic integration” module has led to the  loss of Russia’s interest in any forms of cooperation with Ukraine, including cooperation in the military-industrial complex. For instance, experts believe that JSC «Климов» is about to transfer the work of assembling aircraft engines from Ukraine to Saint-Petersburg for political reasons.  Ukraine probably hopes that it will be compensated by the orders from European customers, but it is rather naïve, because the military-industrial complex  in Europe is now shrinking [«Ведомости» 20.08.2007].

In fact, it’s not absolutely clear what the future holds for the Russian military-industrial complex. It is not clear, either, whether it is worth Ukraine’s enterprises clinging to the very deep labour division (joints and components) with their Russian counterparts. Perhaps, in this case, purely technical considerations are no less and no more important for both parties than political ones. But the new methods of providing Ukraine  with gas (from Russia and Central Asia) and of gas’s transporting gas to Europe via Ukraine were definitely strongly influenced by talks about Ukraine’s hopes of joining the EU and NATO and were fraught with the possibility of serious economic damage to Ukraine (at least at the earlier stage of these changes).

Two questions arise as a result. Does Ukraine really needed to declare its desire to join the EU and NATO quite so loudly? And is it so necessary for Russia to react to these declarations so violently? In other words: is there any rationale behind either party’s actions?

The potential economic benefits and costs to Ukraine of joining the EU cannot be reliably calculated. If Ukraine were to  join the EU now, the majority of the population is initially likely to lose out but it is just as likely that they will benefit in the longer term. Any intermediate effects will be different for different parts of Ukraine and different professional groups. But the same would be the case, if Ukraine  deedn’t  join the EU. And the most important thing to to realise is that the indirect effects of both options will be unpredictable and uncontrollable.   

On the other hand, there is no need to sever economic relations between Ukraine and Russia simply because of the possibility of Ukraine becoming a member of the EU and NATO. These relations could become instrumental for the development of economic relations between Russia and EU. The analyst Bruce Jackson made the point in the interview for the magazine  «Эксперт. Украина» that: “Ukraine’s affiliation to the European structures, objectively, will make European markets opened for the Russians” [Волошин 2006].  Jackson, of course, is lobbying the desire (whose? Pentagons? Who else’s?) to include Ukraine in NATO, but his considerations are by all means well founded, whatever his motives may be. 

In view of all of these uncertainties, and they are too numerous, it would be more honest simply to stop pretending that economic arguments are really significant in debating this issue. It is not really clear how serious both parties are about their economic reasons. Did they make reliable calculations? It is perfectly possible, that they themselves realise the weakness of their economic arguments. But in any case, it is not hard for an outside observer to see  that the motivation of theUkrainian euro-enthusiasts is different. It is determined  by the “mythological imperative”. 

The narrative, arranged for the needs of the struggle for independence, persistently contrasts Ukraine as a historical successor of Kievan Rus’ and therefore as a part of the West, with Russia – the historical successor of Tartar “Orda” and Oriental Despotism. The position of Western Ukraine with its Greek Catholic religious identity which has for some time been the main protagonist of Ukrainian nationalism, is rather craftily emphasized. The characterisation of the part of Ukraine that lies to the West of the Dnieper (“Правобережная Украинаa”) as a former “colony” of the rotten Habsburg Empire (Musil’s “Kakania”) and the “damned Poles” (Taras Bulba’s) is forgotten and replaced by its characterisation as a part and parcel of the “civilized West”. Such a narrative would impose on Ukraine a further drift towards the West as would be seen an escape from  “Muscovite bondage”, as dissociation from its antithesis and simultaneous “alter idem” (as Girard calls it) and return to its mother culture. As one observer stresses Ukraine  hasn’t actually taken any practical steps to join NATO but simply declares loudly its intention to do so, and 55%  of the population (according to a 2002 poll) believed that it is absolutely necessary to do so within 5 years. The observer calls this “schizophrenia” [Sherr 2003 : 129]. He thinks, that president Kuchma simply tried to balance the concessions that Ukraine has made to Russia in all possible areas by this conspicuous plan of joining NATO. A.Lieven reminds us that the scenario of military manoeuvres in Crimea, imitating the suppression of secessionist uprising in that area, was Ukraine’s idea and was based on two incorrect assumptions  [Lieven 1999 : ???]. It appears that everything was supposed to be exactly the other way round, specifically that Ukraine was supposed to take a more hardline stance on a number of issues in its relations with Russia and keep silent on the issue of joining the EU and NATO. 

The «Mythological imperative» seems irrational and counterproductive even regardless even of just how accurate the image of Ukraine as a European nation in contrast to Russia really is.  

But this irrational motivation for Ukraine to continue drifting away from Russia is still not the deepest layer of Ukraine’s geopolitical consciousness. There is another -- never explicitly articulated – the existence of which the outside observer can only guess at. 

Ordinary Ukrainians originally chose political independence not because they passionately craved  the notorious “yellow-blue substance” but because they thought that it would help Ukraine to get rid of its economic dependence on Russia, which would help them, they hoped, somehow to improve their welfare. If those expectations were met, as I.Prizel wrote (1998), Ukraine would have to choose between Peronism or de facto federalization. I.Prizel considered (at that time) the second option more likely because of Ukraine’s clearly visible regional differences and  clan- dominated  political structure and culture.  And if that came about, I.Prizel anticipated that Russia could make an attempt to “bifurcate” Ukraine    [Prizel 1998 : 421] 

Both possibilities worry the Ukrainian public sub-conscious, leading to the hope that Ukraine, finding herself within the EU, would be rid of the burden of excessive sovereignty and would reduce the problem of its inner geopolitical architecture, i.e.  avoid the need to work out the formula for its geopolitical unity as a “circumstantial”, even “accidental” state.   

Eastern Europe’ experience could be edifying in this sense. Ukraine  entered the same historical trajectory as other East European countries did almost a century ago. And it styles itself on them. But if it sees itself as analogous, moving down the same road but lagging just slightly behind, then it would be useful for Ukraine to take closer look at what has happened to them. The time span of their real independent existence  has turned out to be insignificant. Their sovereignty was ephemeral and disappeared completely during WW II. After the war, they all found themselves  Moscow’s satellites. And at the very moment they were freed of Soviet geopolitical and ideological control, they were absorbed by the EU 

In terms and context of the previous époch, East European countries were simply never really sovereign nations. The current criteria of independence are of course not the same as they were 100 or even 50 years ago, but, in any case, all East European states came into being trough a separation from larger (imperial or sub-global, if you like) geopolitical formation and have retained the massive inertia of “systemness” and because of that a tendency to return to the “system”. The majority of the youngest states, despite all their sovereneignist rhetoric and even their industrious utilisation of their juridical sovereignty, would have been easily absorbed by any seriously imperialist agency prepared to take them under its common roof and even direct protection. 

But the point is, that in our times, the “system” does not seek to rob an entity of its sovereignty, but, on the contrary, prefer virtually to thrust sovereignty upon it, allowing itself only with great reluctance to become involved in its affairs and only where and when there is or seems to be the a real threat to international security.   

Judging by the lessons of Est-European countries’ “independent” existence, and taking into account the strong systemic pressure on all currently so called “sovereignties”, it would seem that  Ukraine’s destiny is to become a part of one of the higher-rank sub-global systemic formations. In any case, its political establishment is probably subconsciously convinced of this eventuality and is afraid that if it doesn’t  manage to hide under the EU’s umbrella, it is doomed to be recaptured into the post Soviet space, which it sees, by historical inertia, as a zone of Moscow’s undivided  supremacy.

I would never dare  insist that such a fear is completely groundless. Moscow’s reputation is deservedly bad, and it will still need quite a long time to prove that she is “better than her reputation” (as the Figaro used to say). Besides, Moscow is also enslaved by its own massive geopolitical inertia. That’s why it persistently reminds Ukraine that it must make a choice: either it is with Moscow, or against it. At the Eurasian Economic Community summit in Sochi, Fradkov (then the Russian PM) invited Ukraine’s PM Yanukovich (who was there as a guest) to join EurAsEs. And Putin during the session of Collective Security Treaty Organization when Uzbekistan had been accepted into this Organisation, emphasized that the CSTO has to complement EurAsEs. This effectively means that EurAsEs will not to be limited in scope only to projects of economic cooperation. Moscow’s key insistence  is now that Ukraine should cancel its plan of joining NATO and reorient  itself towards the CSTO (Эксперт Украина : 2006).

Thus, Ukraine is being prompted to choose. It is not allowed to sit on the fence, is it? But sitting on two chairs is exactly what is most expedient for Ukraine, whereas the radical choice will bring the fewest benefits.

As L Shevtsova thinks the “Ukrainian political class has already outgrown the level where Ukraine is expected to choose; but the Russian political class with its rude and rigid mentality is still thinking in these terms”. If she is right about Ukrainian politicians, then – so much the better. But how exactly, in this case, can Ukraine continue to sit on the fence? Shevtsova sees it like this: “Ukraine’s elite is not really satisfied either with Kuchma’s multi-vector policy, whose essence is in manoeuvring between the West and Russia. Ukraine is in search of a formula that would make it easier

To continue its political drift towards the West but, at the same time, would allow it to use its relationships with Moscow to make its integration into Europe as painless as possible….. It is entirely conceivable that Ukraine is just the agency that is destined to bridge the gap between civilisations – a role that Russian foreign minister Lavrov hopes to reserve for Russia.    

Both Russia and Ukraine, (and, by the way, Turkey) are fatally inclined to talk big about their intermediary position between Europe and Asia and offer themselves to play the role of the “bridge” between the two. This rhetoric and metaphor is, perhaps, good for each country’s  exalted self- identification and propaganda, but nobody has managed to demonstrate so far, how it can be actually materialised. The only specific project, directly following from the metaphor of “bridge”, is a project of the transcontinental super highway, which is now under discussion in Moscow as one of its big “national ideas”.

But, as we see, this cliché metaphor can trigger another version of the tussle over status and prestige. Indeed, when Shevtsova suggests that Russia sees itself as this “bridge”, whereas, in fact, this role belongs to Ukraine, it is simply provoking this tussle itself, or unimaginatively allowing itself to be provoked by it.  And all the turgid sterile arguments about “who is who” begin again. 

A Motyl seems to think that Russia and Ukraine, if they remain isolated and authoritarian, will be inclined “either to unite in unequal partnership against the West, or to come into conflict with each other. In both cases Russia will be most likely the dominant party.” [Motyl 2003: 15]. So far Ukraine hasn’t still chosen between Russia and the West, and “it would be foolhardy for it to do so” [Motyl 2003 : 29]. And he seems to recommend to Ukraine to go on trying to keep all its balls in the air (i. e. the “multi-vector strategy”) letting practical diplomacy solve any problems as they come up.  In other words, he continues to conceptualise Ukraine’s positioning in terms of manoeuvring between two reference poles and sub-global blocks. [Motyl 2003: 32]. 

In reality, however, the choice between the EU and the Euro-East is a false one. Firstly, while Ukraine is labouring over its choice, both Europes can reconfigure into something absolutely different and within this new configuration certain parts of Europe might be rearranged along lines that are barely visible and even anticipated at this stage. For instance a “Three Tier Europe”. And, incidentally, everyone who was once within the Soviet Union, might find themselves there again – within the “third” or “outer” tier of the larger EU. 

Secondly, this choice simply is not necessary because besides inclusion into the EU, on the one hand, and the restoration of a kind of Russo-Ukrainian module, on the other, there is a third option: both parties could become integrated into the world community not via an intermediate level of the system but directly and in their own right. 

A few states in different parts of the world are now on their way to just such a geopolitical arrangement. Most of them are small rich states, reminiscent more of joint stock companies than regular “nation states” as we understand them [см. Кустарев : 2007]. But this path is open to any geopolitical entity. Gorgon Brown, who became recently British PM, explained his Euro-scepticism by his belief that Britain will gain more of belonging to the world as a whole than to any closed sub-global configuration (like the EU) 

Global system is rearranging from the a cell-like configuration into a club-like one, something well observed already by theoreticians, whatever terminology they use to describe this transformation. But if this is the case, there is no point for newly emerging states to belatedly and laboriously go through the phases that older nation-states had to pass through, or to repeat the phase of neighbourhood relationships either of the “Westphalian treaty” type based on the balance of power, or federalisation. They can belong to different networks along different lines, doing their best to ensure that these network cannot exist without them, or the least that their inclusion improves these networks’ efficiency.

The realisation of such a project is not just a fascinating intellectual task but, perhaps, a historical destiny for such entities like Ukraine, and even Russia herself. But in order to follow this trajectory, a geopolitical entity needs a considerable amount of creative imagination and be prepared to make bold experiments. Such conceptualisation of geopolitics demands from Ukraine a refocusing of its diplomatic activity from Moscow and Washington (or Brussels) to onto the geopolitical space of the entire world. 

 

References/Notes

[1] This is the subtitle of A Lieven’s book on Ukrainian-Russian relations [Lieven 1999]

[2] I don’t mean to suggest that the considerable (and probably proportionate, in terms of Ukraine’s population) Ukrainian element in the very highest echelons of the Soviet “partocracy” (political establishment), close ethnic affinity, and mixed blood were enough to preserve Russo-Ukrainian statehood. And it would be even more presumptuous to see it as a good reason for the restoration of the two countries’ union (it doesn’t mean, of course, there aren’t and will never be other good reasons for it).

[3] One must be cautious when applying Girard’s hypothesis. It doesn’t propose that two identical actors will necessarily be in a state of open hostility. It assumes only that if two actors are mutually hostile, the roots of their persistent and intensive hostility will more likely be found in their similarity than in their difference, as they themselves very often insist. Russo-Ukrainian relations can be also described as “jealousy” or “resentment” – mutual rather than one-way (as both parties prefer to think) especially the Russian detractors of “Ukraineship”. .  

[4] Mostly, I daresay, spurious and disorienting for everyone involved.

[5] Russia tends to present its de facto one-party system and increasingly stale public as an indication of structural and organizational stability. Ukraine, for its own part, tends to depict its completely chaotic party system, where self-identification movements, groups of rigid vested interests, and clienteles of “oligarchs” imitate political parties, as genuine political plurality. Thus, both of them confuse each other and mutually reinforce pathological tendencies.  

[6] Understanding that the answers to these questions are ideologically corrupted and politicised prompts a desire to find objective answers. One assumes this to be the task of academic historical study, which is expected to do its best to meet our expectations. But to no avail. First, the scholarly community has already done a not inconsiderable amount to objectify Russian, Ukrainian and Russo-Ukrainian historiography. And it is not the academic community’s  fault that nobody wants to listen to them. Second, even if  historiography was perfectly detached, its efforts would be in vain, because the active agency of the national narrative (i.e. the intelligentsia) does not want this glorious objectivity, having, on the contrary, a strong demand for a bluntly judgemental narrative, beneficial for their vested interests – be they purely emotional, political or financial.    

[7] The popular view is that once upon a time new ethnic entities were born, but no longer. And consequently, any ethnos which emerges now  is considered artificial and illegitimate. This is presumptuous.  Of course, multitudes are not consolidating themselves into cultural entities in urban literate environment in the same way as they did in agrarian illiterate environments, but ethno-genesis never stops.  It contradicts neither an essentialist nor existentialist view of this process.

[8] In George Bernard Shaw’s play “The Apple Cart”, the Americans tell London that they regret their break from Britain and would like to come back under the British crown. Whitehall, of course, panicks.

[9] Russian public debate is split as to Kiev’s official ethno-cultural policy. Exalted horror stories about the suppression of the Russian ethnic essence are told alongside calm reports saying that there is nothing of concern taking place.

[10]  However the “cultural portfolio” of the average citizen is much richer now than before, and no urban professional can get by without some kind of second identity. And this means that, in fact, there is no categorical necessity to choose between a mono-cultural and multi-cultural society. Multi-culture is not a project. It’s a fact of life.   

[11] This has created two versions of Russian nationalism: the expansionist and the isolationist, just like American nationalism since the beginning of XX-th century. The analogy is intriguing and  rather alarming. American society is still capable of accepting this split because of its highly efficient constitutional  tradition, but the Russian constitution will be of little help if the controversy along this potential front really heats up.   

[12] The way that the project is realised is pre-determined and obligatory. And it is difficult to make changes to both the objectives themselves and to the means of achieving them. The experience of the Bolsheviks, who tried to transform Russia, is an extreme example of what could be the result. The serious project is supposed  not to suppress but to encourage the creative energy of its performers. In order to achieve this, the project has to be set up in as flexible and general terms as possible, allowing its agencies sufficient freedom to manoeuvre as the opportunity arises. .  

[13] It is known from experience already, that a geopolitical entity incapable of securing its stability, is supposed to be put behind a “cordon sanitaire”, and, as a last resort, to be dismantled.  But the dismantling of a geopolitical entity is usually self-inflicted. The international community, or anyone prepared to fulfil this task with the international community’s silent consent, only plays the role of ultimate guarantor of security within the currently stateless territory (Afghanistan, Somalia) as they have become the sources of threat to international security. Therefore, all moral and legal casuistry about whether or not NATO had the right to destroy Yugoslavia is irrelevant. Yugoslavia was put under NATO’s de facto control because it allegedly became a dangerous source of insecurity. To insist that NATO’s action was inexcusable, it would be necessary and sufficient to prove that Yugoslavia had not become a source of danger . The same logic works in case of American operation in Iraq. It will be considered legitimate if Saddam really was a threat to peace. And the same logic covers Moscow’s action in Chechnya.  

[14] When Germany was replaced by the US in this East-European geopolitical rift, the Soviet Union seemed an unassailable monolith, and unimaginative experts simply forgot about the “Ukrainian” card. Only Ukrainian emigrants in America continued persistently to play it, as they simply didn’t see what else to do.

[15] still tbe Старый попугай в перьях ястреба The old parrot in falcon’s feathers Zbigniev Brzezinski, as expected, repeatedly argues that Russia without Ukraine is better than Russia with Ukraine. Former Polish president Kvasnievski allows himself the same rhetoric.

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