АЛЕКСАНДР КУСТАРЕВ
РОССИЯ И УКРАИНА
First Published in Russian: “Kosmopolis—Космополис (МГИМО) №2 2007
Cousinage est dangereux voisinage
When Slaves argue among themselves (Спор славян между собою: Пушкин)
Russian-Ukrainian
relations today represent an excellent example of fraternal rivalry (brotherly
hatred) [1] Russia and Ukraine think
about each other too much. A 2006 poll [Взгляд 2006, referring to ВЦИОМ] showed that
67% of Russians watch Ukraine, 16% regularly, 52% from time to time. This is
very high level of concern. And I mean the 15% figure, not the breath-taking
67%.
But
the seemingly routine accompanying report is actually even more informative
than the poll it refers to. The report is written in such a way as to lead
readers tow2ards a particular interpretation of the figures. 15%” looks very
modest compared to the 67% figure but i8n fact it’s ver4y significant. There is
also great emphasis placed on the fact that young people are much less
interested in Ukrainian affairs than the elderly. In the over 45 age group
The
figure is 73% whereas in the 18-24 age group it’s “only” 56%. But the most
especially characteristic is the following: “Every second Russian (52%)
believes that Ukrainian people are taking a wrong direction. But only 9% think
the opposite, and in fact only a third of those, i.e. 3% are absolutely
positive.” Of course, what is important is not how exactly Russians evaluate
Ukraine’s direction, but that they have strong propensity to evaluate them in
the first place. The compiler of this report just doesn’t notice that. It is
more important for him that even the pathetic 9%, who approve Ukraine’s policy
are not certain they are right. And the report doesn’t say anything about those
who disapprove of Ukraine’s direction. Perhaps, ВЦИОМ just
failed to ensure informational symmetry (which is perfectly possible). Perhaps,
the data were massaged by Взгляд’s editors.
Regardless of how much ordinary Russians
think about Ukraine, politically active segment of Russian society is very much
concerned with Ukraine (subconsciously or consciously) judging by ВЦИОМ's and Взгляд’s Freudean slips -- that’s a fact. Ukraine, and its close
relationships with Russia are important themes of Russian political life.
As to Ukraine’s obsession with Russia, it is not
only absolutely obvious but has in fact been totally dominating fully been
dominating Ukraine’s self-identification narrative for a long time.
“Ukraine is
nor Russia” – this is the title of Leonid Kuchma’s book (2004). And the former
Ukrainian president is far from an extreme anti-Russian nationalist. But he
couldn’t or didn’t want to find a different title for his book. Ant if he
simply realised that he couldn’t afford to call it anything else, then that
fact is even more significant.
The ethnical affinity of Ukrainians
and Russians overburdens the mind of both. By purely objective characteristics
(looking from outside) Russians and Ukrainians are much closer to each other
than Serbs and Croates, for instance6 Germans and Austrians, and even
Lombardians and Sicilians.
Whether or not Ukrainians and Russians were
different “nations” two century ago, really doesn’t matter now. At that time
the problem of sel- identification wasn not an issue for either. Both consisted
of a multitude of local groups and rthnicitis, who all could pronounce
themselves “nations” if they wanted to.
In Soviet time, Moscow encouraged a narrative of
self-identification and ethic (“national”) art and culture. Russians and
Ukrainians (by birth) lived together in big industrial cities (both in Russia
and Ukraine), which has led to the emergence of a sort of cultural amalgam and,
of course, inter-marriage. Family links between Ukraine and Russia were no less
extensive than between the two parts of the divided Germany.
Russia and Ukraine were the two biggest members of
Soviet Union, making up its core. They constituted, if you like, the
“two-headed hegemon” of the Soviet geopolitical conglomerate.
Because of the
intensely authoritarian character of the Soviet state, all of the ethnic
entities participating in it, believed that they were being completely
suppressed by the Centre, i.e. Moscow, i.e. Russia. And this alleged
subordination of Ukraine to Russia is now clearly reflected in the emerging
Ukrainian national narrative with its strong “post-colonial” tone. But Russia
itself, at the end of the USSR’s existence, also developed this complex, and
not without reason.
Besides, Ukrainians do not actually realise just how
popular amongst Russians was the op0posite myth that Moscow was dominated by
Ukrainians. Of corse, ethnically-focused Ukrainian purists do not recognise
Khrushchev or the “Dnepropenrovsk mafia” as genuine Ukrainians, but for Russian
purists they were “from Ukraine” and subsequently “them” as opposed to “us”. It
doesn’t matter who was right. What
really matters, that in the “centre”, i.e. in the political leadership of the
Soviet Union, there was an integral core that could be identified as
“Russukrainian” or Ukrorussian” [2].
Their long-existent shared political (Soviet)
establishment, their massive common ethno-cultural heritage and active merger
at the time of industrialisation created a very special, probably
unprecedented “ethno-geopolitical dyad”
with an unusual, perhaps unique mode of coexistence. The closest to this are,
perhaps, anglo-scottish and anglo-irish examples.
Both Ukraine and Russia have a double identity. The
people themselves (their ethnic elites) are absolutely free to perceive
themselves as different entities and to name themselves differently in sdifferent
contexts, but their residual, or, conversely, on the contrary, newly acquired
double identity is still there and will remain forever.
In Ukraine’s case this is perfectly visible. No
matter hoe much it insists on its own special ethnic identity and historical
destiny, it is perceived nonetheless by the rest of the world as just “another
Russia”. And more than that: it perceives itself as such, at least
subconsciously. Many observers (for instance, Riabchuk : 2003) have diagnose
this ambivalent self-identification
of
the
Ukrainian citizens.
The same syndrome can be seen in Russia as well. It
is less visible because Russians tend to see in Ukrainians the same Russians as
themselves and to deny Ukrainians the status of a different people. But it is
not difficult to detect another more abstract idea of Russians’ and Ukrainians’
complete identities which can be turned either direction: it is possible to say
that Ukraine is Russia as well as that Russia is Ukraine, isn’t it?
The Ukrainian-Russian (or Russian-Ukrainian?)
historian N.I. Kostomarov, reflecting on the ethnic status of Slavonic regions
within the Romanov Empire, suggested that there were in fact “two Russian
peoples” This well thought out and cunning
new notion was later picked up in variety of guises (including Grushevsky’s
«Ukraine-Rus’» notion), but did not appeal either to Ukrainian nationalist
activists, nor to the Petersburg Bureaucracy which prior to 1917) was
attempting to build up the Russian nation both in the French model (“from the
State”) and the German model (“from the Volk”)
The former were afraid that if they saw themselves
as “the other Russians” instead of “Ukrainians”, they would lose their
substance and subsequently of their right to independence (and even to autonomy).
And the latter, ironically, were terrified that if Ukrainians were converted
from “just Russians” into “the other Russians”, their right to independence
would in fact gain actual recognition.
In our time, when the the idea of the fusion of “a
people” and “a state” into a special substance called “a nation” (be it
“Staatsnation”, “Kulturnation” or “Volksstaat”) is no longer considered any
more either an imperative norm or realistically achievable, Kostomarov’s idea
can be rewritten as the idea of two Russian states, if not in name then in
essence. A number of approximate analogies do exist: Germany/Austria, Tshech
Rep./Slovakia, Serbia/Croatia several Anglo-saxon countries (by their origins
at least and through common language). All of them look fairly close to this
pattern, at least for the outside observer, if not for themselves,.
Different people can live within the same state. The
same people can live in two different states. If an independent geopolitical
entity has existed for a long time, citizens with different ethnicities
(strongly or feebly experienced) will inevitably have split self-identities.
The same will happen to the same people , divided into two states. It looks
that a significant part of the Ukrainian public are perfectly prepared to consider
Ukraine as just another Russia. S0 an interesting collection of essays is
called just that “The Two Rus’s” [Две Руси, 2004]
The relationship between Russia and Ukraine is
heavily overburdened by status-prestige considerations. It’s a perfect
illustration of what René Girard baptised “rivalité mimétique. Girard sets up
the substance of his theory of conflict explaining Islamist terrorism after
9/11: “The conflict can not be explained adequately by differences. In fact, the conflict is rooted in the
competition, mimetic rivalry of living creature, nations, cultures. The competition
is generated by the desire to imitate the other, to achieve the same as the
other, with the help of violence if necessary. Of course, terrorists are
threatening as from another world but they are motivated not by the difference
between their world and ours. The differences take away two world from each
other. The urgent need to be tse same as the other, to become identical with
him – that’s what if fraught with terrorism. Human relationships are
essentially relationships of imitation, competition ……” [Girard 2001]
Girard’s general theory of competition, therefore,
suggests that the competition between two players, regardless of their
contrasting rhetoric, in reality is fed energetically by their sameness. [3]
This is ostensibly supported by the dominant topics
of the Ukrainian-Russian dialogue. The first bone of contention between them is
Kievan Rus’. Whose heritage is it? Russia’s or Ukraine’s? In fact, it is a
debate about who can call themselves “genuine Russians”. Even the right to be given very name «Rus’»
is harshly disputed. Titles such as like «Ukraine is Rus’» or «The Stolen
Name» speak for themselves. There are
three pretenders to this historical name: Russians, Ukrainians and, Rusins, who
are, one argument goes, actually the purest descendants of historical Rus’, at
least in purely racial terms.
Before the
collapse of USSR, Russian--Ukraine was overshadowed by anti-Soviet rhetoric,
which united all dissident groups. But after Ukraine became independent, this
rivalery emerged in its purest form. Both countries were concerned not only
with of their own individual position in various spurious comparator ratings[4], but even more so with
which of the two of them was placed higher. The media compare Ukraine and
Russia persistently when reviewing such ratings. A good example is the
following: the commentary of a 2007 World Bank Report on the quality of
administration in different countries
[«Ведомости»,
16 July 2007]. Djth countries would be perfectly happy to find herself even
second from bottom, if only the other was placed bottom. This competitive
atmosphere is especially heated because both countries are perfectly aware that
they are steadfastly watched by global public opinion, and in particular by the
USA and EU who have taken on (not entirely without a reason) the role of judges
who evaluate other countries’ achievements in democracy, civilisation or human
rights.
“Mimetic
competition” is, of course, a two-sides coin. It can be fruitful, destructive
(the case of terrorism) or simply sterile for one partner or for both. Much
depends on the field where competition takes place. The efficiency of purely
economic competition, for instance, is higher than competition for social
prestige (status).
Economic competition is much more compatible with
cooperation than political competition or competition for higher social status.
The last, probably, rules out cooperation alltogether. It is always perfectly
possible to arrange a “return match” in cases of economic competition, provided
the winner is not entitled to suppress competition. Each loser has the chance
of fresh start, and this is exactly what secures the constant innovation,
overall enrichment and society’s progress onward and forward.
Competition
in the political sphere can also be fruitful, but successful outcome is
less likely because it is easier to simulate the results of political
competition, and unfortunately it could all the outcome of political competition is easier to
simulate and unfortunately all can be
com down to such a simulation. The political space
both of Russia and Ukraine is nowadays
full of simulation (although not necessarily premeditated) [5].
And finally competition purely for prestige in
self-identification is absolutely sterile and perhaps even detrimental. At
worst, it can end in violence. And in any case it leads to a stalemate of
constant repetition of the same scenario (as in Gogol’s classics “how Ivan
Ivanovich and Ivan Nikiforovich quarrelled), where both sides consider
themselves the winner, without really achieving anything.
Competition for status generally manifests itself as
angry wrangling taking place in the field of such a competition of
historiography, or more precisely national tradition or -- as we prefer to call
it nowadays – narrative [6].
The purpose of national narrative is to prove the
legitimacy of a sovereign geopolitical entity. The pattern of such narrative
was devised by the early nation states who emerged in Europe and America in XIX
century. They rested on two pillars. First, on the presentation of a given
multitude as an integral unity of blood, mother tongue (Muttersprache) and
terrain (Boden). Second, on the existence of a “common biography”, allegedly
undivided and uninterrupted. Nation-states reconstructed their lengthy and
heroic past as a gradual consolidation or struggle for liberation.
The narratives of every state to emerge subsequently
has been built after this model. It was assumed that the was no nation without
a state and no state without a nation. The Ukrainian narrative was built up in
the same way.
The Ukrainian narrative is today, arguably, the most
self-assertive in the world. Probably
-- because Ukraine’s self-identification has been suppressed for a long time,
and the engineering of its own narrative is belated. Indeed, the only
comparably active narrative is that of Russia. Although the narrative itself is much older, its agency
is very keen to rewrite it afresh. Nowone is currently able to match the
Russians and the Ukrainians in their deadly serious attitude to the very notion of “nation”. It appears
that their emotional investment in their nationhood is greater than of France
and Germany during the whole “long XIX century” (i.e. until the end of the
Second World War). Unsurprisingly, it’s a Ukrainian (Olgerd Ippolit
Bochkovs’ky) who represents the most essentialist interpretation of a “nation”
as a phenomenon [Бочковьский 1918]. And Russian authors seem to be the most
persistent in popularising his approach which is in itself significant.
It would be pointless to remind Ukrainians and
Russians and, above all , their “ethno-intelligentsia” (as the agency responsible
for thic hectic narrativist activity), that the “nation” is a myth (though
instrumental and perhaps even realisable) and that their totemic myths (as all
others) are full of fabrication. It would be arrogant and hypocritical to
insist that all statist commonalities cancel out of any kind of epic
self-identification mythology. Above all else, it is simply not realistic.
because
creating totemic myth is an important manifestation of the existence of any
collective entity regardless of what exactly is its foundation. And this kind
of mythmaking has for some time now been the
raison d’etre of an expanding professional group – and we can’t simply
shut it up, can we?
The only hope is that Russian and Ukrainian
political life will escape from the shadow of this anachronistic passeist
narrative. Quite simply, this narrative is counterproductive at the beginning
of the new XXI century and is no longere suitable as a paradigm for political
life absolutely regardless of how truthful or untruthful it may be..
Don’t look down
The Ukrainian narrative, constructed in the XIX
century mould attempts to convince Ukraine and the outside world that the
Ukrainian nation (or proto-nation) has existed for centuries and has its own
own lengthy and respectable tradition of statehood.
Why is it so necessary to prove this? Because the agents of this narrative
i8nstinctivelym fear
that if they do not do it, they will (a) lose the
right to exist in their own eyes and (b) lose their legitimacy within the world
order.
The narrative which tends to consider Ukraine as an
eternal essentialist entity, is, of course, a reaction to historical criticism
of the origins and composition of the modern-day Ukraine as a state. This
criticism, especially popular among Russians, has two strands. First, critics
insist that Ukrainian ethnicity is an artificial construction and “chimerical”
[Родин 2006]. Second, critics say that Ukraine, internationally recognised
after the Brest peace treaty, is what used to be known as the “Right bank
Little Russia” («правобережная Малороссия»). Contemporary Ukraine is
7 times bigger. It was created within and by the USSR. Ukraine, the argument
goes, has profited from the results of the Russian Empire’s and the USSR’s
territorial expansion. Therefore, Ukraine obtained territory that didn’t belong
to it, purely because the borders between Soviet Republics automatically became
international borders [Афанасьева 2005 : 26-29].
What
objections can Ukraine raise to these arguments? [7] It can maintain that any
ethnic entity is an intellectual construct – according to current convention.
And as to her recent territorial acquisitions, Ukraine can and should point
outt that the majority of existing geopolitical units (including Russia itself)
are themselves not “organic” but historical and situational, and the only
adequate reason for their existence is international recognition. If, suppose,
the south-eastern part of Ukraine (Novorossia), Krym or Galizia declare
independence or their intention to reunite with Russia and Poland; and if
Russia stirred up controversy (not absurd in purely legal terms, even if
absolutely pointless) about the legitimacy of converting intra-Soviet
republican borders into international ones, the same problems would occure on
different levels, in a different context, and those conflicts would be decided
in a different way – amicably or not, with intermediaries or not etc. But non of
this has happened, so what is the point of discussing it? Do you want to happen
what happened around Ailsas-Lorrain or Karabakh? No? Then forget all of these
“historical» and “ethnographical” arguments.
Not a single geopolitical entity, from
the archetypal ones, like England and France, to the most recently born, like
Bosnia and Eritrea, was created through the Will of God as people was in XIXth
century believed. Leopold Ranke was wrong when he said «Staaten sind Gedanken Gottes». The
phenomenon of “state” (”the state” and anyone of a type) was not providential
but circumstantial product of evolution, and, I daresay, largely experimental.
The
youngest states have neither a moral nor a legal obligation to
characterize themselves in this way, that is as the manifestation of some
eternal ideal “national” substance, maliciously suppressed until now,. Anyone,
of course, can stylise themselves in this way, if they so desire, but whether
it is really necessary, is an open question.
The technical necessity (for diplomatic
efficiency) of a teleological and essentialist ethnic self- asserting narrative
is also highly doubtful. The story of the distant historical past, no matter
how immaculately true or how craftily constructed, will not rescue Ukraine or Russia
or any other geopolitical entity, if it is not cemented by something more
substantial (or rather material) or by some kind of collective achievements. In
the past, it would have meant military victories; now the achievements are more
likely to feature economic
successes or victories on the football pitch. On the contrary, any narrative
that a multitude imposes on itself, will hang over its head as a Damoclean
sword (witch on Khoma Brut’s neck: Gogol)
, inculcating upon the multitude not rational but doctrinal political
orientations and solutions and preventing any search for an efficient formula
for pragmatic civic solidarity (unity).
The future existence of newly emerged
state-commonalities no longer depends on their past existence, either legally,
morally or technically. Postmodern states do not need historical depth.
This is true for all states, even those that took shape before the Modern era.
Now, even France and England, China and the USA have to reinvent themselves.
The fact that they have existed since some “….teenth” century or since the
Stone Age is not a sufficient reason for their continued existence.
Anatol
Lieven (Lieven : 139) in
his relatively recent book on Russo-Ukraiian relations
quotes Ukrainian politologist Vilen Gorsky who said: “The more you think about
your glorious past the more difficult it is for you to deal with your present”.
And quite right too. I don’t know to whom Gorsky addressed this sentence (very
Nietzschean, by the way), but it is certainly relevant for any postmodern
state, whatever its past – glorious, not very glorious, not glorious at all or
just non existent.
Today
Ukraine’s real “past” is the dissolution of USSR, itself the result of the
absolutely natural tendency of enormous and incoherent formations to disintegration
and which was incidentally and presciently anticipated as inevitable by the Ukrainian nationalist
Yuri Lipa (of all people) [Липа 1954 : ???].
The rest of
Ukraine’s history is archaeology and folklore. Kievan Rus’ is a kind of
Carthage or even more accurately Atlantis. Prolonged casuistry is possible in
terms of recent past, but it is dangerous for both parties. This “lava” is still
not fully cooled.Iit would be better for all to let it cool as soon as
possible, rather than heating it up again.
The cult of the
heroic struggle for independence is equally inefficient for practical policies6
irrespective of whether the heroism is exaggerated or not. This cult is fraught
with irrational confrontation, costly for all parties, of recently emerged
states and those, whom their narrative portrays as their former oppressors.
Never mind that it stands in the way of any practical activity in the new
states, which remain drugged by the feeling of their real or imagined
victory.
It is often pointed out that the struggle
for independence never generated the concept of Ukraine as an individual
geopolitical entity. But how could it be otherwise? Indeed, it is difficult to
see now how anybody could have hoped this would happen. Neither the USA nor
India conceptualise themselves as victors who managed to throw off the British
yoke. Whereas Haiti, of all nations, perceived itself as victorious over
France, Zimbabwe -- as victorious over Britain. Palestine attempts to present
itself as victorious over Israel. Has it helped them much?
In
contrast with classical territorial states, whom they routinely imitate,
postmodern geopolitical entities did not create themselves but emerged as
fillers in an the already existing
global system created not by them and almost without their participation.
They don’t need a passeist narrative. They need and can afford something
different, namely a futuristic narrative, or, if you like, a project.
It is said that Ukraine does not have yet such a
project. And this, it is assumed (perhaps correctly) is dangerous because newly emerged states can embody their
sovereignty at the first stage of their existence only in the form of such a
project.
In Russia, both
the public at large and the influential (hard to say to which extent) part of
the political establishment (partocracy) would be happy to see Pproject
Ukraine” collapse – rivalité mimétique,
once more. But Moscow should be more cautious, because the failure of “Project
Ukraine” will create enormous problems for Russia itself. For example, even if
inthe simplest scenario Kiev decided it wanted to return to the bosom of
Russian-Ukrainian unity [8], such a move could undo the irresistible federalist tendency in this
“Greater Russiaa”. So far it is no evidence that the Russian public and the
Russian establishment realize the trap that Moscow would fall into in such
circumstances, nor, indeed, have any idea of how it would get out of it.
In the meantime,
today’s Russia is also a postmodern state, albeit overburdened (and not
equipped as admirers of Russian statehood would prefer to believe, equipped)
with the institutions and political culture of the country’s pre-modern and
imperial past. As a project, Russia is very vague and shaky itself. Its
reinvention has been so far blocked in a spectacular manner by futile noisy
attempts to revive its traditional statehood and glorious superpower status.
However, as a native American wisdom goes: if you notice that your horse is
dead, the best strategy is to dismount. The Russian imperial statist tradition
is a dead horse. Full stop.
The futurist narrative is, of course, more creative
than the passeist Or, shall we say, the
idea of a project is more useful than of a narrative. However, the transition
from a passeist to futurist mode of
self-identification is not an easy one for any historical political entity. In
the first place, a project could be no more than a futurological stylisation of
a passeist narrative and condemn such a project’s agents to remain to a vicious
tautological circle («Заколдованное место» Гоголя).
Such is the desperation to find a pattern
(even a fictional one) of ethnic homogenisation and comprehensive (total)
statist solidarist mobilization of a circumstantial geopolitical entity.
At the moment everyone seems to be
falling over each other to warn Ukraine against embarking on such a project,
which is necessary as Ukraine (despite its highly active ethno-intelligentsia)
has been constitutionally declared as multi-ethnic society; everyone dwelling
within the Ukrainian borders is recognized as Ukrainian citizen. On the other
hand, the problem of language (according to witnesses) seems to concern no one;
Ukrainians use Russian willingly, and
Russians would be happy to see the Ukrainian language as the official state
language. And some cultural homogenisationis inevitable anyway [9] to the
extent that it is necessary for the efficiency of any common economic activity
[10].
But the problems related to the ethnic
heterogeneity and solidarist mobilization may become more acute and even bring
the two parties to the brink of armed conflict, if a geopolitical entity is
incapable of offering its citizens a viable
alternative project. The commentators of aggressive patriotism explain it in a
dozen different ways but it is enough to refer to one: it is the easiest way to
fill up political vacuum. Just like conversation about weather when there is
nothing else to talk about.
There
are some indications, that post-modern multiculturalism finds itself under
pressure in this vacuum. The source of this pressure can be found in the upper
echelons of public opinion where the situation is given intensive thought.
Taras Kuzio, seemingly the most learned of commentators, says: “If nation
building is not considered as desirable any more, and often criticized, Ukraine
will find herself in a disadvantageous situation. This can be understood as
follows: if they were
allowed to pursue ethnic unification, why aren’t we? Such a dramatic rhetoric reflects total
confusion of an elite, squeezed between two authoritative doctrines, not yet
recognising that escape from this awkward situation can only be found through
an option rather than making a choice between these two doctrines.
Russia has a stronger tendency than any
other country to hide in futuristically stylised passeism. Russia, no less
vigorously. than Ukraine is stirring up “national self-consciousness” preferring
to argue that its past obsession with its imperial mission caused its week
ethnic self-identity, and that this deficit can now be rectified by the country
mobilizing now under the banner of its legendary statehood [11].
To avoid such disguised passeism, it is essential to have a well
developed method of devising a geopolitical entity. Such a met5hod requires
rationally oriented, adequately qualified and strongly opinionated (partisan)
government or a charismatic leader with powerful intuition who is capable of
breaking with the past himself and
mobilising the will of those whom he is going (promises) to bring out of
this past.
Let us imagine
that, one of these is in
place. This is still not enough, because such a strategic project is fraught
with many dangers – any project, shall we say, is “its own weakest point”
Constructivist
voluntarism (bureaucratic or charismatic) may be no less dangerous than an
attempt by a situational commonality to
imitate retrospectively a certain authoritative pattern of constitutional
solidarity. Creative (projective) constructivism, as radical liberals (like F.von
Hayek) insist (and not without reason) can produce “lifeless forms” and
eventually immensely reduce society’s efficiency in terms of economy, energy,
information, or ecology [12].
Both the narrative and the project have to be
emotionally inspiring but they must also have as few obligations and as few
details as possible. Their place is alongside arms and colours in the package
of national symbols. The project’s rhetoric has to be closer to the slogan and
the brand than to the instruction or technical specification. And the imperative behind the project must
be not at odds with the imperative imposed
on any geopolitical entity by the global geopolitical order.
And this order expects only one thing from all its
members: not to become a source of international disorder. The international community doesn’t want
excessive geopolitical dynamics; it is oriented around the preservation of the
status quo. [13]
All of this reminds me of a classic joke: An old Jew
wonders: What is most important in this war? Some people say the infantry;
others say artillery; or tanks; or the aviation…. All rubbish; what’s most
important in this war is to stay alive.
Generally
speaking, what is most important for any newly emerging state is to stay alive. For them, the project is
more important than any narrative, and current day-to-day policies are more
important than the project. According
to Renan’s famous metaphor “a nation is
a daily referendum”, which means that nation is a perishable and even ephemeral
substance: here today, gont tomorrow. One can say nowadays, paraphrasing this
metaphor, that any newly emerging state is an experiment.
It means that the historically circumstantial
political entities, that are known by the names
“Ukraine” and “Russia” test their legitimacy anew every day; in
other words they have to secure a
sufficient minimum level of civic loyalty from their citizens, and thus in turn
their stability. And if they succeed time and again in these regular
rehabilitations, they will achieve certain inertia of existence, occupying
their niche within the global web with its, as its activists prefer to speak,
“mission” or “uniqueness”. These
“Ukraine” and “Russia” may become unrecognisable and unacceptable for the current generation of “Russians” and
“Ukrainians” but that is not, I’m afraid to say, any of their bloody business,
simply because it won’t be them, who will be living in these entities. Would a
German or a Japanese character from the end of XVIIIth century be satisfied
with contemporary Germany or Japan? I suspect they would feel feeling like
Merlin finding himself on Wembley stadium, or Rip van Winkle on Broadway.
How long is this experimental phase
supposed to last? One might imagine that it will never be over for any state in
existence at the moment. In any case, Ukraine and Russia are yet to complete
the experimental phase: they are bound to experiment time and again and their
strategy of experimentation has to observe certain rules. Here, we’re going to
look at just one of them: never announce something you do not know how to
realize. And that means first and foremost, do not hope that the narcissistic myth of your
past will help you to survive.
West-ho! Either?
Nations , in their relations with each other,
can become hostages of their mythological imperatives.
Which conflict is primary and which is secondary? Is
conflict of status, expressed as narrative, generated by the conflict of vested
geopolitical interests or vice versa? Or are they is autonomous6 and do not
depend on each other? Or perhaps there in no real conflict between these two
countries at all and the clash of
narratives is not more than a completely sterile conspicuous
demonstration of prestige? And, finally, who are the agencies of mutual
hostility – the same in both cases or different?
A.Lieven cites Vilen Gorski’s opinion: “All these
quarrels about history are relevant only for a handful of nationalist intellectuals;
ordinary people, both Ukrainians and Russians, wouldn’t give a damn”
But an analysis of current Ukrainian statehood’s
reveals its shortcomings as a lack of institutions, the influence of informal
agencies, insufficient social control over the state, and the destructive
activities of elites (in German: destructives Elitenhаndeln). The manipulation of
narrative for the sake of prestige-status could be considered as one such
“destructive activity”, could it not? And here you go: a “handful of nationalist
intellectuals”, as V.Gorski calls them, are practicing exactly this. So, even
if it is just a mouse it is perfectly capable of begetting a mountain.
Our materialistic instinct suggests that all
conflicts (quarrels) in the field of narrative are just the propagandist
orchestration of other conflicts – for the territory, resources, markets, rents
et cetera. But even if this is true, they are perfectly capable, having been
turned into habit, of becoming self-perpetuating or even of generating new conflicts.
In fact, national practices of self-identification and nations’ geopolitical
and economic interests influence each others in turn.
It is risky, of course, to insist that there are no
geopolitical and economic contradictions between two countries. Nevertheless,
the odd thing could be that these conflicts were triggered (or at least have
intensified) by the problems of both states’ self-identification. It would be
two hazardous to say that the conflict about the “pipe” is far-fetched or
secondary. But to eliminate this suspicion is also not easy.
In an
article, written specifically for the Financial Times to explain the situation
to Western business circles, a big boss Viktor Khristenko says that Russia is
simply putting a stop to the old Soviet practice of subsidizing energy prices
for its neighbours. We, he says, are just switching to the market economy, but
find ourselves being blamed for politicising the energy market. In the 15 years
since the dissolution of the USSR we’ve been subsidizing former Soviet
Republics by selling energy at prices 25% below the world market average. This
has to stop in any event, and this, in fact, a condition of Russia’s joining
the IMF. Furthermore -- and more crucially: “Our plan to lay the North-European
pipe under the Baltic Sea is just a way of diversing Europe’s gas supply
[Khristenko 2006].
This
all looks highly reasonable, but another viewpoint is perfectly possible: “The IEA believes that if Russia wants to
remain a major energy producing world power and Gasprom to be the main
guarantee of Europe’s and Asia’s energy security, they have to invest
differently: not to buy assets and lay
new pipes but to develop new deposits and cut costs. But the Russian
Government to whom this advice is addressed, shows no intention of taking it”
[Петрачкова 2006]
Thus,
it is not necessary to disavow Khristenko’s arguments in order to detect a
strongly irrational element in Moscow’s energy strategy. This irrationality can
be explained, of course, in different ways, but the irresistible desire to
repress or at least to punish Ukraine is one possible explanation and indeed
the most likely.
But
to punish Ukraine for what? Perhaps, just for its self-promotional nationalist positioning and no doubt
for Ukraine’s declared intention to drift towards the West, to the EU and the
NATO, potentially even joining these groups formally.
The idea of tearing Ukraine
away from Russia has been cherished for a long time by the military-diplomatic
circles of states who found themselves in acute geopolitical competition with
Petersburg-Moscow. It’s they who regularly tried to play the Ukrainian card
against Russia. It was persistently recommended by so called Ostforschung
(Germany’s consultative clique in the
imperialist era), vacillating between creating a belt of puppet states
along the border with Russia and the straightforward colonisation of Slavonic
lands (taken to an absurd extreme by Hitler) [14].
When Ukraine and Russia were
finally split without any outside agency’s help into two separate geopolitical
entities, there were those who were keen to deepen this split [15].
But to rationalize the old
geopolitical thesis about the necessity of separating Ukraine from Russia, now
is much more difficult now than it was. In the current military-diplomatic environment,
in the atmosphere of fundamental pacifism in Europe, the classical geopolitical
arguments for this split are irrelevant and simply anachronistic.
Only
a couple of influential American think tanks worshipping “democratic
fundamentalism” (Gabiel Garcia Marques) continue to support the idea of Ukraine
drifting further from Russia, converting this geopolitical concept into
geo-ideological one. Ukraine is placed at the “East of American messianic
consciousness” as a kind of an “outpost of democracy”. F.Lukyanov, editor of
the journal “Russia in global politics” writes: “The Orange Revolution for
foreign observers is nothing less than a decisive battle between Russia and a
“united West” for strategic influence over
the last remaining country of “Graeter
Europe”, that has yet to find its identity …..
Moscow, with its typically blunt foreign policy, has never made a secret
of its purely geopolitical motives; it even emphasized them. Western capitals
cautiously avoided all geopolitical allusions, stressing the values of
democracy, but this mask slipped time and again both in the comments of media
as well as the occasional statements of some politicians”. (Лукьянов 2006)
Nonetheless, the entry of
Ukraine into the EU and/or NATO is not on the agenda for the time being. The
EU’s further enlargement is not envisaged by its establishment. Ukraine is
included in a few EU cooperation arrangements (Action Plan, Partnership and Cooperation Agreement, Wider
Europe Initiative, European Neighbourhood
Policy) but they do not anticipate Ukraine’s later accession to the EU,
on the contrary; they are specifically devised as alternatives to this
scenario [Gallina 2005 : 209]. The same
author believes that “in spite of the rhetoric, Ukraine is still considered as
a Europe’s backyard by in the EU’s influential circles, where they are secretly
glad, that Ukraine simply isn’t fit for EU membership according to the official
criteria, and this is precisely what frees the EU from the responsibility of
making that crucial political choices [Gallina 2005 : 209] But, regardless of
what’s going on within the formal diplomatic sphere, the public debate about
the perspective of Ukraine joining the EU is in itself a significant part of Russian-Ukrainian relations.
The conspicuous yearning of Ukrainian
politicians to join the “euro-Atlantic
integration” module has led to the loss
of Russia’s interest in any forms of cooperation with Ukraine, including
cooperation in the military-industrial complex. For instance, experts believe
that JSC «Климов» is about to transfer the
work of assembling aircraft engines from Ukraine to Saint-Petersburg for
political reasons. Ukraine probably
hopes that it will be compensated by the orders from European customers, but it
is rather naïve, because the military-industrial complex in Europe is now shrinking [«Ведомости» 20.08.2007].
In
fact, it’s not absolutely clear what the future holds for the Russian military-industrial
complex. It is not clear, either, whether it is worth Ukraine’s enterprises clinging to the very deep labour division (joints
and components) with their Russian counterparts. Perhaps, in this case,
purely technical considerations are no less and no more important for both parties than political ones.
But the new methods of providing Ukraine
with gas (from Russia and Central Asia) and of gas’s transporting gas to
Europe via Ukraine were definitely strongly influenced by talks about Ukraine’s
hopes of joining the EU and NATO and were fraught with the possibility of
serious economic damage to Ukraine (at least at the earlier stage of these
changes).
Two questions arise as a
result. Does Ukraine really needed to declare its desire to join the EU and NATO quite so loudly? And is
it so necessary for Russia to react to these declarations so violently? In
other words: is there any rationale behind either party’s actions?
The potential economic
benefits and costs to Ukraine of joining the EU cannot be reliably calculated.
If Ukraine were to join the EU now, the
majority of the population is initially likely to lose out but it is just as
likely that they will benefit in the longer term. Any intermediate effects will
be different for different parts of Ukraine and different professional groups.
But the same would be the case, if Ukraine
deedn’t join the EU. And the
most important thing to to realise is that the indirect effects of both options
will be unpredictable and uncontrollable.
On
the other hand, there is no need to sever economic relations between Ukraine
and Russia simply because of the possibility of Ukraine becoming a member of
the EU and NATO. These relations could
become instrumental for the development of economic relations between Russia
and EU. The analyst Bruce Jackson made the point in the interview for
the magazine «Эксперт. Украина» that: “Ukraine’s affiliation to the European structures,
objectively, will make European markets opened for the Russians” [Волошин 2006]. Jackson, of
course, is lobbying the desire (whose? Pentagons? Who else’s?) to include
Ukraine in NATO, but his considerations are by all means well founded, whatever
his motives may be.
In view of all of these
uncertainties, and they are too numerous, it would be more honest simply to
stop pretending that economic arguments are really significant in debating this
issue. It is not really clear how serious both parties are about their economic
reasons. Did they make reliable calculations? It is perfectly possible, that
they themselves realise the weakness of their economic arguments. But in any
case, it is not hard for an outside observer to see that the motivation of theUkrainian euro-enthusiasts is
different. It is determined by the “mythological imperative”.
The narrative, arranged for the needs of the
struggle for independence, persistently contrasts
Ukraine as a historical successor of Kievan Rus’ and therefore as a part
of the West, with Russia – the historical successor of Tartar “Orda” and
Oriental Despotism. The position of
Western Ukraine with its Greek Catholic religious identity which has for some
time been the main protagonist of Ukrainian nationalism, is rather craftily
emphasized. The characterisation of the
part of Ukraine that lies to the West of the Dnieper (“Правобережная Украинаa”) as a former “colony”
of the rotten Habsburg Empire (Musil’s “Kakania”) and the “damned Poles” (Taras
Bulba’s) is forgotten and replaced by its characterisation as a part and parcel
of the “civilized West”. Such a narrative would impose on Ukraine a further drift towards the
West as would be seen an escape from
“Muscovite bondage”, as dissociation from its antithesis and
simultaneous “alter idem” (as Girard calls it) and return to its mother culture. As one
observer stresses Ukraine hasn’t
actually taken any practical steps to join NATO but simply declares loudly its
intention to do so, and 55% of the
population (according to a 2002 poll) believed that it is absolutely necessary
to do so within 5 years. The observer calls this “schizophrenia” [Sherr 2003 : 129]. He thinks, that president Kuchma simply tried to balance the
concessions that Ukraine has made to Russia in all possible areas by this
conspicuous plan of joining NATO. A.Lieven reminds us that the scenario of
military manoeuvres in Crimea, imitating the suppression of secessionist
uprising in that area, was Ukraine’s idea and was based on two incorrect
assumptions [Lieven 1999 : ???]. It
appears that everything was supposed to be exactly the other way round,
specifically that Ukraine was supposed
to take a more hardline stance on a number of issues in its relations with
Russia and keep silent on the issue of joining the EU and NATO.
The «Mythological imperative» seems irrational and
counterproductive even regardless even of just how accurate the image of
Ukraine as a European nation in contrast to Russia really is.
But this irrational
motivation for Ukraine to continue drifting away from Russia is still not the
deepest layer of Ukraine’s geopolitical consciousness. There is another -- never explicitly articulated – the existence of
which the outside observer can only guess at.
Ordinary
Ukrainians originally chose political independence not because they
passionately craved the notorious
“yellow-blue substance” but because they thought that it would help Ukraine to
get rid of its economic dependence on Russia, which would help them,
they hoped, somehow to improve their welfare. If those expectations were
met, as I.Prizel wrote (1998), Ukraine would have to choose between Peronism or
de facto federalization. I.Prizel considered (at that time) the second option
more likely because of Ukraine’s clearly visible regional differences and clan- dominated political structure and culture.
And if that came about, I.Prizel anticipated that Russia could make an
attempt to “bifurcate” Ukraine
[Prizel 1998 : 421]
Both
possibilities worry the Ukrainian public sub-conscious, leading to the hope
that Ukraine, finding herself within the EU, would be rid of the burden of
excessive sovereignty and would reduce the problem of its inner geopolitical
architecture, i.e. avoid the need to work out the formula for its
geopolitical unity as a “circumstantial”, even “accidental” state.
Eastern Europe’ experience
could be edifying in this sense. Ukraine
entered the same historical trajectory as other East European countries
did almost a century ago. And it styles itself on them. But if it sees itself
as analogous, moving down the same road but lagging just slightly behind, then
it would be useful for Ukraine to take closer look at what has happened to
them. The time span of their real independent existence has turned out to be insignificant. Their
sovereignty was ephemeral and disappeared completely during WW II. After the
war, they all found themselves Moscow’s
satellites. And at the very moment they were freed of Soviet geopolitical and
ideological control, they were absorbed by the EU
In terms and context of the
previous époch, East European countries were simply never really sovereign
nations. The current criteria of independence are of course not the same as
they were 100 or even 50 years ago, but, in any case, all East European states
came into being trough a separation from larger (imperial or sub-global, if you
like) geopolitical formation and have retained the massive inertia of
“systemness” and because of that a tendency to return to the “system”. The
majority of the youngest states, despite all their sovereneignist rhetoric and
even their industrious utilisation of their juridical sovereignty, would have
been easily absorbed by any seriously imperialist agency prepared to take them
under its common roof and even direct protection.
But the point is, that in our
times, the “system” does not seek to rob an entity of its sovereignty, but, on
the contrary, prefer virtually to thrust sovereignty upon it, allowing itself
only with great reluctance to become involved in its affairs and only where and
when there is or seems to be the a real threat to international security.
Judging by the lessons of
Est-European countries’ “independent” existence, and taking into account the
strong systemic pressure on all currently so called “sovereignties”, it would
seem that Ukraine’s destiny is to
become a part of one of the higher-rank sub-global systemic formations. In any
case, its political establishment is probably subconsciously convinced of this
eventuality and is afraid that if it doesn’t
manage to hide under the EU’s umbrella, it is doomed to be recaptured
into the post Soviet space, which it sees, by historical inertia, as a zone of
Moscow’s undivided supremacy.
I
would never dare insist that such a
fear is completely groundless. Moscow’s reputation is deservedly bad, and it
will still need quite a long time to prove that she is “better than her
reputation” (as the Figaro used to say). Besides, Moscow is also enslaved by
its own massive geopolitical inertia. That’s why it persistently reminds
Ukraine that it must make a choice: either it is with Moscow, or against it. At
the Eurasian Economic Community summit in Sochi, Fradkov (then the Russian PM)
invited Ukraine’s PM Yanukovich (who was there as a guest) to join EurAsEs. And
Putin during the session of Collective Security Treaty Organization when Uzbekistan
had been accepted into this Organisation, emphasized that the CSTO has to
complement EurAsEs. This effectively means that
EurAsEs will not to be limited in scope only to projects of economic
cooperation. Moscow’s key insistence is
now that Ukraine should cancel its plan of joining NATO and reorient itself towards the CSTO (Эксперт Украина : 2006).
Thus,
Ukraine is being prompted to choose. It is not allowed to sit on the fence, is it? But sitting on
two chairs is exactly what is most expedient for Ukraine, whereas the radical
choice will bring the fewest benefits.
As L
Shevtsova thinks the “Ukrainian political class has already outgrown the level
where Ukraine is expected to choose; but the Russian political class with its
rude and rigid mentality is still thinking in these terms”. If she is right about Ukrainian politicians, then – so much the better. But
how exactly, in this case, can Ukraine continue to sit on the fence? Shevtsova
sees it like this: “Ukraine’s elite is not really satisfied either with
Kuchma’s multi-vector policy, whose essence is in manoeuvring between the West
and Russia. Ukraine is in search of a formula that would make it easier
To
continue its political drift towards the West but, at the same time, would
allow it to use its relationships with Moscow to make its integration into
Europe as painless as possible….. It is entirely conceivable that Ukraine is
just the agency that is destined to bridge the gap between civilisations – a
role that Russian foreign minister Lavrov hopes to reserve for Russia.
Both Russia and Ukraine, (and, by the way, Turkey) are fatally inclined
to talk big about their intermediary position between Europe and Asia and offer
themselves to play the role of the “bridge” between the two. This rhetoric and
metaphor is, perhaps, good for each country’s
exalted self- identification and propaganda, but nobody has managed to
demonstrate so far, how it can be actually materialised. The only specific
project, directly following from the metaphor of “bridge”, is a project of the
transcontinental super highway, which is now under discussion in Moscow as one
of its big “national ideas”.
But, as we see, this cliché
metaphor can trigger another version of the tussle over status and prestige.
Indeed, when Shevtsova suggests that Russia sees itself as this “bridge”,
whereas, in fact, this role belongs to Ukraine, it is simply provoking this
tussle itself, or unimaginatively allowing
itself to be provoked by it. And all
the turgid sterile arguments about “who is who”
begin again.
A Motyl seems to think that Russia and Ukraine, if they remain isolated and authoritarian,
will be inclined “either to unite in unequal partnership against the West, or
to come into conflict with each other. In both cases Russia will be most likely
the dominant party.” [Motyl 2003: 15]. So far Ukraine hasn’t still chosen
between Russia and the West, and “it would be foolhardy for it to do so” [Motyl
2003 : 29]. And he seems to recommend to Ukraine to go on trying to keep all
its balls in the air (i. e. the “multi-vector strategy”) letting practical
diplomacy solve any problems as they come up.
In other words, he continues to conceptualise Ukraine’s positioning in
terms of manoeuvring between two reference poles and sub-global blocks. [Motyl
2003: 32].
In reality, however, the
choice between the EU and the Euro-East is a false one. Firstly, while Ukraine
is labouring over its choice, both Europes can reconfigure into something
absolutely different and within this new configuration certain parts of Europe
might be rearranged along lines that are barely visible and even anticipated at
this stage. For instance a “Three Tier Europe”. And, incidentally, everyone who
was once within the Soviet Union, might find themselves there again – within the “third” or “outer” tier of the
larger EU.
Secondly, this choice simply
is not necessary because besides inclusion into the EU, on the one hand, and the restoration of a kind of
Russo-Ukrainian module, on the other, there is a third option: both parties
could become integrated into the world community not via an intermediate level
of the system but directly and in their own right.
A few states in different
parts of the world are now on their way to just such a geopolitical
arrangement. Most of them are small rich states, reminiscent more of joint
stock companies than regular “nation states” as we understand them [см. Кустарев : 2007]. But this path is open to
any geopolitical entity. Gorgon Brown, who became recently British PM,
explained his Euro-scepticism by his belief that Britain will gain more of
belonging to the world as a whole than to any closed sub-global configuration
(like the EU)
Global system is rearranging
from the a cell-like configuration into a club-like one, something well
observed already by theoreticians, whatever terminology they use to describe
this transformation. But if this is the case, there is no point for newly
emerging states to belatedly and laboriously go through the phases that older
nation-states had to pass through, or to repeat the phase of neighbourhood
relationships either of the
“Westphalian treaty” type based on the balance of power, or federalisation. They can belong to different
networks along different lines, doing their best to ensure that these network
cannot exist without them, or the least that their inclusion improves these
networks’ efficiency.
The realisation of such a project is not just a
fascinating intellectual task but, perhaps, a historical destiny for such
entities like Ukraine, and even Russia herself. But in order to follow this
trajectory, a geopolitical entity needs a considerable amount of creative imagination
and be prepared to make bold experiments. Such conceptualisation of geopolitics
demands from Ukraine a refocusing of its diplomatic activity from Moscow and
Washington (or Brussels) to onto the geopolitical space of the entire world.
[6] Understanding
that the answers to these questions are ideologically corrupted and politicised
prompts a desire to find objective answers. One assumes this to be the task of
academic historical study, which is expected to do its best to meet our
expectations. But to no avail. First, the scholarly community has already done
a not inconsiderable amount to objectify Russian, Ukrainian and Russo-Ukrainian
historiography. And it is not the academic community’s fault that nobody wants to listen to them.
Second, even if historiography was
perfectly detached, its efforts would be in vain, because the active agency of
the national narrative (i.e. the intelligentsia) does not want this glorious
objectivity, having, on the contrary, a strong demand for a bluntly judgemental
narrative, beneficial for their vested interests – be they purely emotional,
political or financial.
[11] This
has created two versions of Russian nationalism: the expansionist and the
isolationist, just like American nationalism since the beginning of XX-th
century. The analogy is intriguing and rather
alarming. American society is still capable of accepting this split because of
its highly efficient constitutional
tradition, but the Russian constitution will be of little help if the
controversy along this potential front really heats up.
[13]
It is known from experience already, that a geopolitical entity incapable of
securing its stability, is supposed to be put behind a “cordon sanitaire”, and,
as a last resort, to be dismantled. But
the dismantling of a geopolitical entity is usually self-inflicted. The
international community, or anyone prepared to fulfil this task with the
international community’s silent consent, only plays the role of ultimate
guarantor of security within the currently stateless territory (Afghanistan,
Somalia) as they have become the sources of threat to international
security. Therefore, all moral and legal casuistry about whether or not
NATO had the right to destroy Yugoslavia is irrelevant. Yugoslavia was put
under NATO’s de facto control because it allegedly became a dangerous source of
insecurity. To insist that NATO’s action was inexcusable, it would be necessary
and sufficient to prove that Yugoslavia had not become a source of danger . The
same logic works in case of American operation in Iraq. It will be considered
legitimate if Saddam really was a threat to peace. And the same logic covers
Moscow’s action in Chechnya.
[14] When Germany was replaced by the US in this East-European geopolitical
rift, the Soviet Union seemed an unassailable monolith, and unimaginative
experts simply forgot about the “Ukrainian” card. Only Ukrainian emigrants in
America continued persistently to play it, as they simply didn’t see what else
to do.
[15] still tbe Старый попугай в перьях ястреба The old parrot in falcon’s feathers Zbigniev
Brzezinski, as expected, repeatedly argues that Russia without Ukraine is
better than Russia with Ukraine. Former Polish president Kvasnievski allows
himself the same rhetoric.
Bibliography
Афанасьева Е. 2005. Государство или революция. М.
Бочковський
И.О. 1918. Нацiональна справа. Статi про нацiональне питання в звязку з сучасною войною.
Вiдень (Вена) 2006
Ведомости 2007. 20.08
Взгляд 29 июля
2006
Волошин О. 2006. Нейтралитета не
получится. Эксперт-Украина. 14.08
Две Руси (ред. Л.Ившина). Киев 2004
Западные окраины Российской империи 2006. (Ред.
М.Долбилов, А.Миллер). М.
Кустарев А. Структурная
геополитическая динамика. Ближний восток. Космополис №2 2007
Лiпа
Ю. 1954. Розподiл Росii. NY
Лукьянов Ф. "Новое время" №32
13 августа 2006
Барабанов М.
Украина-Россия: Ссора с работодателем. 2006 Ведомости» 20.07.
Петрачкова А,
Филиппов И. IEA считает, что Россия и Газпром неверно
развивают газавую отрасль. Ведомости
20.07..
Родин С. 2006. Отрекаясь от русского имени. М.
Шевцова Л. 2006.Украина и Белоруссия: Российские мифы . Ведомости 29 марта.
Украина мiж Росиею и Заходом Киiв 2000
ЭкспертУкраина 2006. №32 19.08
N Gallina. Beyond the Eastern Enlargement of the European Union // Ukraine at
a Crossroads (ed N Hayoz, A Lushnycky) Bern 2005 з
203
Gallina
N. Staat, Institutionaler Wandel und staatliche Leistungsfaehigkeit in der
Ukraine. Bern 2006
Girard R. 2001.Le Monde 05.11.01.
Grzymala-Busse
A., Johns P. Recoceptualizing the State: Lessons from Post-Communism //
Pilitics and Society, 2002 № 4
Khristenko V. Energy collaboration is free
from Soviet ghosts FT.May 7 2006
Kuzio T.2001. Identity and Nation Building
in Ukraine // Ethnicities v 1, № 3
Lieven A 1999. Ukraine and Russia. A
fraternal rivalry Washington DC
Motyl
A. 2003 Ukraine, Europe and Russia: Exclusion and Dependence? // Ambivalent
Neighbors (ed A Lieven, D Trenin). Washington DC
Prizel I: National Identity and Forein
Policy. Nationalism and Leadership ai Poland, Russia, and Ukraine Cambridge
University Press 1998
Riabchuk
M. One State, Two countries? // Transit, № 23, 2003,
http://www.iwm.at/t-23txt8.htm)
J
Sherr The Dual Enlargment and Ukraine
// Ambivalent Neighbors (ed A Lieven, D Trenin) Washington DC 2003
